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THE International Labour Organization is a specialized agency associated with the United Nations, where the world's workers, employers and government representatives meet to collaborate for peace based on justice.

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justice, its sixty-six member nations are bound by the conditions of their adherence to the organization to accept its authority and to ratify its conventions as speedily as possible.

record of Israel is an excellent one, having already ratified some fifteen decisions.

A. Morse, Director of the I.L.O. shortly after achieving independence and membership of the United Nations.

The visit here of Mr. David A. Morse, Director of the I.L.O., is associated with the intention of that body to enlarge its activity in Israel. Means will be furnished for research into labour problems, for the interchange of experts and the endowment of more scholarships for study abroad.

These in a way mark the stepping up of activities already in operation in Israel which have done a great deal towards improving industrial and labour conditions in this country.

This, in itself, is considered a useful contribution to the work of the I.L.O., for at the basis of the philosophy of that body is recognition of the interdependence of all countries of the world, in an effort to achieve the ideal of peace and the social progress. There can be no lasting economic or social gains in any land while labour conditions and backwardness exist in another, even remote part of the world.

The next step, therefore, is to encourage the labour conditions, such as pre-war Japan, contributed in recognizable measure to economic depression in the industrial countries of Europe, while at the other end of the scale the vast development of productivity in the United States was an indication to such lands of how such unfair competition could be overcome by increased technical efficiency rather than by the depression of labour conditions.

It is therefore to the credit of Israel that in the five short years of her membership in the I.L.O., she has already achieved a noteworthy record in regard to the attention she has paid to, and the advantage she has taken of, the expert and technical assistance provided by both I.L.O. and other agencies of the United Nations. It is reckoned that two-thirds of the schemes advocated and initiated by such experts in Israel have been carried into effect, and this is a notably high proportion. Nor is Israel entirely on the receiving end of the work, for already some of its own experts have been called upon to render technical assistance in specialized fields in other countries. In the face of the vast implications for peace and social progress inherent in the work of the International Labour Organization, it is to be regretted that the work and aims of that body are not more consistently and continuously brought to the attention of the public and are not more centrally featured in the discussions on Labour issues, social legislation and the like in the Knesset.

The cause perhaps may lie in the fact that until now, insofar as the Government is concerned, the I.L.O. has been something of a departmental concern. The delegation at Geneva consists of two representatives of the Government, two from the Histadrut and two from the Manufacturers' Association. As far as the Government representation is concerned, this has been of the highest quality, and the delegates have won a considerable reputation both for their masterly presentation of Israel issues and for the effective contribution they have made to the general progress of the organization.

One of these representatives is Mr. Ben-Zion, and his elevation to the Supreme Court bench now makes it possible for his place to be taken by a member of the Knesset, if possible, by one of the leaders of the Knesset Labour Committee. This would put the Israel representation on a par with the best, even there is a precedent for this: one of the French delegates was a former Prime Minister of France.

At a time when the solid and patient work for peace performed by great international agencies of the United Nations such as the I.L.O., is overshadowed by the tensions which exist between nations on the political level, it cannot be anything other than salutary that due emphasis be placed by the Government on the participation in such constructive activities.

Disengaging Occupation Forces in Germany

Berlin Conference Faces European Security Problem

By RICHARD LOWENTHAL

BERLIN.—This is the second of a series of articles on the coming Berlin conference. The first appeared yesterday.

BOTH the Soviet and the Western Powers are approaching the Berlin conference with definite ideas about the solution of the European security problem. So far they differ radically. This is only natural at the outset of a conference, and after a long period of propaganda warfare. All that really matters is whether both sides will be ready to revise their ideas in the light of discussion.

The Western Powers start from the conviction that German rearmament within a Western alliance is indispensable for a long-term balance of forces on the continent. They will therefore demand that a united Germany must be free to conclude such an alliance and would rather renounce German unity and go ahead with an alliance with Western Germany than agree to leave Germany outside the Western military system.

To meet the Russian fear of a German "revisionist" attack backed by the United States, the Western Powers presumably would be prepared to offer a guarantee that Germany would not attempt to change its present territorial status by force; the West German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, has made it clear that although he could not accept the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland as legal, he would support any undertaking not to use violence as a means of revision; and a corresponding declaration by the Western Powers is believed to have been drafted.

Defining Frontiers

To the Russians and their Polish satellites, such an alliance would be quite insufficient. Before agreeing to a free and united Germany, they want to be sure that this Germany will accept its frontiers as final; and they will not be put off with the statement that the substance of the frontier settlement must await the peace treaty. Nor will they be content with a guarantee from Powers which purpose to conclude a military agreement with Germany, because the Russians fear that, in practice, the backing afforded by that alliance would be more effective in encouraging German aggression than the guarantee would be in putting a brake on it.

The Russians begin from the thesis that their security requires the disappearance of the Americans from the centre of Europe, and the isolation of Germany from the United States with the help of the West European Powers. Accordingly, they have begun to talk about a "European security system."

to contain "German militarism" implying that Russia is a European Power while the United States is not. To spare French susceptibilities, they have not lately repeated their proposal of March, 1953, for a German national army; but their conception of security implies that the proposal still stands. At the same time they insist that all the Powers should renounce in advance any military alliance with Germany. To meet the Germans' own fears, the Russians presumably would be prepared to supplement their own guarantee against Germany, with a joint guarantee of the existing frontiers as legal and final.

Excluding the U.S.

From the viewpoint of all the Western Powers, the basic objection to these proposals is, of course, the attempt to exclude the United States from Europe, which by itself would be sufficient to ensure a permanent predominance of Russian power on the Continent. Nor could the Russians possibly withdraw its forces from Germany unless it was sure that the armed forces of an independent Germany would be both adequate and willing to hold the line against any Russian surprise attack at least as well as the present NATO Atlantic Treaty Organization screen.

Despite the wide divergence of these initial positions, the analysis reveals a certain amount of common ground. From a long-term point of view, both sides are interested in a military disengagement of their main forces; the Russians want to remove the Americans from the centre of Europe and to reduce their own land forces there; but they also realize that without them there is no prospect of French approval of the European Defence Community. Both sides understand that disengagement requires a united and rearmament Germany to ensure against the risks of a military void in the heart of Europe; both now realize that the new security system would have to contain both guarantees for the new German State and guarantees against a revival of German aggression. Finally, both sides now agree that the settlement must be stable, will have to provide an agreed answer to the vexed question of the German-Polish frontier.

Will this common basis be sufficient for agreement to be reached among the Foreign Ministers? Much will depend on how urgent each side considers a settlement, and on how flexible its tactics are going to be in the light of this.

consideration. But it is difficult to imagine any compromise which would not have as its core the idea which Sir Winston Churchill introduced when he recalled Locarno—a security system based not on fixed alliances between two opposed groups of Powers, but on a mutual guarantee under which "every one would rally against the aggressor and come to the aid of the victim." In other words, the four Powers would guarantee a restored Germany against aggression by any of them—in practice the West would guarantee Germany against Russia. But they would also guarantee one another against a rearmament Germany—in practice the West would restrain Germany from any eastward attack by refusing its backing of an unconditional alliance.

Security Guarantees

For the purposes of Western security, a rearmament Germany would be an essential balance against Russian predominance on the Continent; for the purposes of Russian security, British and French interest in peace would act as an effective check on any revival of German aggression. Such a system of guarantees would really become effective unless the participants were agreed on where the frontiers of such a united Germany should be.

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NATURE NOTES

Spring of Winter

THE glory of the hills has not yet faded. The first trumpet note, the rains brought up the buds at the beginning of the month, and the bright sun has opened them.

Today, the story above of the Kabbala ledge and Mt. Carmel are dotted with the acacia marvel of the first short-stemmed blossoms, their blue-black centres smiling like Irish eyes. Yesterday there was only the sparse green of the wild grasses, with here and there a clump of tall, lush green leaves—promising heaven knows what splendour to the uninitiated. But these leaves turn yellow and wither, leaving not a vestige behind—above ground, that is. In August, the huge bulb sends up the flower, the ground white again.

Overnight, the uniform green slope has become colourful, a horn fanfare calling shrilly to claim our attention for what is coming. The Spring of Winter is here, we have lived through thirst and anxiety to welcome it once again.

Elsewhere, too, the flowers stir. In the vineyards narcissi have come up, in waste places the modest Jack-in-the-pulpit sides its pretty head under the heavy sprigged leaves. The birds are perking up in the sunshine, calling their first seductive notes. The ground is a warm, green, such a system of guarantees would really become effective unless the participants were agreed on where the frontiers of such a united Germany should be.

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